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RESPONSES

Correcting the Record Regarding the
Restatement of Property’s Slayer Rule
in the Brooklyn Law Review’s
Symposium Issue on Restatements
Lawrence W. Waggoner†
John H. Langbein††
In 2014, the Brooklyn Law Review published a
symposium issue on Restatements of the Law.1 The organizer
of the symposium, Professor Anita Bernstein, did not afford an
opportunity for Restatement reporters to comment on the
articles.2 The organizer did invite the Director of the American
Law Institute, Lance Liebman, to contribute an essay
commenting on the symposium as a whole.3
Liebman’s essay—unintentionally no doubt—misstated
the position that we took in formulating the slayer rule for the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers.4 Liebman’s misstatement—that we recommended
that the Institute adopt a rule allowing a murderer to inherit
from his or her victim—needs to be corrected.

† Lewis M. Simes Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan;
Reporter, Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers.
†† Sterling Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University; Associate
Reporter, Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers.
1 Symposium, Restatement of . . . , 79 BROOK. L. REV. 381 (2014).
2 See
Anita Bernstein, Symposium Introduction, Onlookers Tell an
Extraordinary Entity What to Do, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 381 (2014).
3 See Lance Liebman, Symposium Afterword, Law Reform Agenda as ALI
Approaches Its Centennial, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 821 (2014).
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.4 (2003) [hereinafter PROPERTY RESTATEMENT] (“Homicide─The Slayer Rule”).
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The passage in question observes that the Institute’s
deliberative process on occasion “resolves an inconsistency”5
among the reporters of different Restatements.
The best example during my Directorship was when Andrew Kull, from
his grounding in the law of restitution and unjust enrichment,
persuaded the membership to require Lawrence Waggoner and John
Langbein, the Reporters for wills and other donative transfer[s], to alter
their recommendation that a murderer be able to inherit from his or her
victim. Indeed, could there be a more unjust enrichment than that?6

The well-accepted general principle embodied in the
slayer rule is that a slayer is not allowed to benefit in any way
from his or her crime.7 We have never questioned that principle,
and accordingly, we did not recommend that “a murderer be able
to inherit from his or her victim.” The position that we
recommended and that the Institute approved is that the
“victim’s intestate estate passes and is administered as if the
slayer predeceased the victim.”8 A long-established corollary of
the slayer rule is that the rule does not cause the slayer to
forfeit his or her own property. If X murders Y, X cannot
inherit from Y, but Y’s estate has no right to X’s property
(although, of course, in a tort action, X may be found liable to
Y’s estate in a wrongful death action).9
The slayer rule has broad application to a number of
subsidiary situations.10 The disagreement between Reporter
Kull and us concerned the application of the slayer rule to one
of these subsidiary situations: when two persons hold property
in joint tenancy, and one slays the other. In a joint tenancy,
each tenant has the unilateral right to sever the tenancy and
take his or her own fractional interest outright. Our position,
strongly supported by the case law and statutes,11 was (and
remains) that because the right to sever was the slayer’s own
property, that right is not forfeited by the crime. As we
explained in the Reporter’s Note, that principle “can be
implemented either by imposing a constructive trust in favor of
the victim’s estate of the victim’s fractional share that would
otherwise pass to the killer by survivorship or (a remedy that
Liebman, supra note 3, at 827.
Id. (emphasis added).
7 See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at cmts. a, b.
8 Id. at cmt. j; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. j (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001).
9 See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at cmts. o and q.
10 See id. cmts. j-n, p.
11 See id. Reporter’s Note No. 8.
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yields the same result) by treating the killing as effecting a
severance of the joint tenancy.”12 Kull’s position is to the
contrary, or, more specifically, that the victim’s estate takes the
whole of the property by right of survivorship (unless there is
some further equitable justification for effecting a severance of
the joint tenancy).13
Our purpose here is not to revisit the merits of the two
positions, but to emphasize that we never recommended that
the Institute adopt a rule that “a murderer be able to inherit
from his or her victim.”14
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Note No. 8.
14

Id.
The Kull motion is reproduced in the Reporter’s Note. See id. Reporter’s
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

